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Kaletra Patent
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Introduction
On December 30, 2010, India's pat-

ent office in Mumbai rejected the
Chicago-based pharmaceutical company Abbott Laboratories' application for a patent on a new version
of Kaletra.1 Kaletra is a second-line
antiretroviral HIV/AIDS drug that is
a combination of lopinavir and ritonavir, and is widely considered the
best treatment for patients who are
resistant to the first-line medicines. 2
After a process that took nearly
four years, Abbott's patent application was rejected because the version of Kaletra under consideration
was deemed not to be an "inventive
step" beyond previous lopinavir/ritonavir combinations that are already
under patent.3 Although this may
sound like a routine patent rejection, civil society groups like Doctors
Without Borders have already hailed
the decision as "a major victory for
public health" because of its potential to make generic drugs available
in the developing world by preventing pharmaceutical companies from
extending patents on products that
are only improvements on existing
treatments.4 Pharmaceutical companies and intellectual property advocates have been quick to point out,
however, that the decision is just the
latest sign that India is not complying with its obligations under the
World Trade Organization's (WTO)
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agree-
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ment.5 Under the TRIPS agreement,
counties are required to, at a minimum, provide protection for products when a product contains an
"inventive step," but the agreement
only clarifies that the term may be
considered synonymous with "nonobvious" and intentionally leaves the
standard vague to allow for flexibility
in domestic laws.6 Given that ambiguity, this decision will likely spark a
debate on whether India is ignoring
its commitments or exercising appropriate discretion. That debate may
have wide-ranging consequences for
both access to medicine and the protection of intellectual property in the
developing world.

protection of the law. These legal protections resulted in the emergence
of major generic firms like Ranbaxy
and Cipla and the construction of
more U.S. Food and Drug Administration-approved manufacturing
centers than any country outside of
the United States.12 This has not only
allowed India to provide access to
cheap medicine to its own citizens,
but also enabled India to become so
prolific as a drug exporter that it is
often referred to as "the pharmacy to
the world' 3
India's patent laws began to evolve
when the country became an original
member of the WTO in 1995.) As a
condition of membership, India was
required to bring its domestic intelThe Evolution of India's
lectual property laws into compliance
with international standards that
Patent Laws
India's patent regime has undergone were elaborated as part of the TRIPS
a series of major transformations over agreement. Since India had not prethe second half of the 20th century viously extended patents to pharthat, taken together, have produced maceutical products, as part of the
the current clashes between multina- agreement it was allowed a 10-year
tional pharmaceutical companies and grace period to fully incorporate
domestic generic manufactures over the international agreement into its
intellectual property.7 Although India domestic patent regime."5 The result
gained independence from Great was a three-stage process for amendBritain in 1947, it took over 20 years ing the Patent Act of 1970, ultimately
before the country was able to enact culminating in the Patent (Amendits own patent law." Perhaps the most ment) Act of 2005, which finally put
notable feature of this first law, "The pharmaceutical patent protection
Patent Act of 1970," is that it removed into full effect.16
Despite the increased protection for
the "patentability of pharmaceutical
products."9 As a result, pharmaceuti- intellectual property that the reforms
cal companies were unable to receive provide, many limits were included
patent protection over the actual within the amended patent laws to
compounds and drugs they devel- ensure "the availability and access of
oped. It was still possible, however, medicines."'17 These limits included
to receive a patent for the process of only allowing patents to be granted
making a substance, but only then for applications that were filed after
for a relatively short maximum time 1995, and any Indian generic manuof seven years from the date of the facturer, which began to produce
a drug before 2005, to continue to
patent. 0
The impact of India's lax patent produce that product.'8 Additionally,
laws was the development of a thriv- Section 3(d) of the new amended pating generic drug-manufacturing sec- ent law was included with the hope of
tor." Indian companies were able to only allowing protection for innovareverse engineer medicines developed tive products that are not derivative of
in other countries, and then produce other substances, and the act defined
the same substances through differ- an "inventive step" as "a feature of
ent processes while still receiving full an invention that involves technical
COST AND END-OF-LIFE CARE * SUMMER 2011

advance as compared to the existing knowledge or having economic
significance or both and that makes
the invention not obvious to a person
skilled in the art."9 These provisions
were designed to take advantage of
the flexibility allowed by the TRIPS
agreement, but it has remained an
open question whether India would
interpret the requirements in a way
that was consistent with the understanding of other signatories of the
TRIPS agreements.20 This was the
backdrop against which Abbott Laboratories filed its patent application
in India.
Background on Abbott's
Application
In 1992, Abbott was awarded its first
patent in the United States for the
drug Ritonavir.21 Ritonavir is an antiretroviral drug that was developed
to treat HIV/AIDS. Ritonavir was
later combined with another drug,
Lopinavir, developed by Abbott; the
combination is marketed as Kaletra. Since its emergence in the world
marketplace, the WHO has identified Kaletra as a preferred secondline treatment to fight drug-resistant
HIV/AIDS, and recommended its
inclusion by governments on their
lists of essential drugs.22 As a result,
Kaletra is an essential part of the
battle against the global HIV/AIDS
epidemic.
On March 24, 2006, Abbott filed a
patent application for a new version
of Kaletra in India.2 Abbott had previously filed a patent application for a
soft-gel formulation of the drug, but
ultimately withdrew the application
after it faced opposition during the
pre-grant review process.24 The new
application was an attempt to patent
a "solid pharmaceutical dosage form"
of Kaletra.25 Abbott argued that this
represented a substantial improvement over the previously marketed
soft-gel tablets. Specifically, Abbott
argued that the new solid dosage
form of Kaletra made the drug more
heat resistant and that it could now
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be taken solely with water.26 Since the
previous version of the drug required
refrigeration and had to be taken
with food, Abbott was able to argue
that this presented a potentially critical advancement of special significance to those battling drug-resistant
forms of HIV/AIDS in the developing
world.
Despite Abbott's claimed innovations, the patent application faced
substantial objections. In addition
to complaints from health advocacy

a known substance, and that the process to convert the soft-gel tablets to
a solid dosage form was already well

known.32
The Decision
After nearly four years of proceedings, India's patent office in Mumbai
released an opinion rejecting Abbott
Laboratories' application to patent a
"solid pharmaceutical dosage" form of
Kaletra.3 3 The decision by Dr. Ruchi
Tiwari, Deputy Controller of Patents

of suitable surfactants' which means
that it "cannot be a mere admixture...
[and]...be held as not patentable
as per provisions of section 3(e)" of
the amended Patents Act.35 In these
two concessions, the decision made
it clear that it was not using either
of the two sections in India's new
domestic patent regime that were
designed to limit the extension of
patents to minor improvements on
existing pharmaceutical products.
Instead, the decision directly con-

The decision by the Indian Patent Office in Mumbai to reject Abbott
Laboratories' application to patent a new solid dosage form of Kaletra
highlights the fact that the TRIPS agreement did not end the tug of war
between groups hoping to increase access to life-saving medications in
the developing world and those seeking to provide robust protection to
intellectual property to ensure that incentives exist to guarantee the continued
development of innovative treatments for diseases. As a result, it remains to be
determined whether the long-term impact of this decision will be to increase
the availability of generic drugs, or alternatively, to reign in the existing
discretion that allows nations to define what constitutes an "inventive step"
when reviewing pharmaceutical patent applications.
groups like Doctors Without Borders,27 four organizations filed formal opposition. 28 Three of the official
opponents were the generic manufacturers Cipla, Okasa, and Matrix. 29
The fourth opponent, the Initiative
for Medicines, Access & Knowledge
(I-MAK), was a U.S.-based nonprofit.3 0 I-MAK is a group of doctors
and lawyers that has waged an international campaign to increase access
to affordable medicines by limiting
what it views as abuses of the patent
system by large multinational corporations.3' Given its importance in the
fight against HIV/AIDS, I-MAK has
made increasing access to generic
versions of Kaletra a top priority. As
a result, I-MAK made two official
filings in opposition to Abbott's patent application, arguing that the new
form of Kaletra was a modification of
298

and Designs, begins by repeating
the history of the filings by Abbott
and the four official opponents to
the applications. The decision then
proceeds to recount the amended 22
claims on file from Abbott, and then
document the arguments and exhibits of the four opponents.
The decision employs an interesting argument discussing the merits. The decision agrees with Abbott
Laboratories that the new version of
Kaletra is "not a mere discovery of a
34
new form of a known substance."
As a consequence, the decision finds
that the product "cannot be held as
not patentable under the provisions
of Section 3(d) of the amended Patents Act." The decision proceeds to
again agree with Abbott Laboratories that in the new version of Kaletra "the invention lies in the selection

sidered whether the patent constitutes an "inventive step" over previous products.3 6 In this analysis, the
decision only considered two exhibits
presented by the opponents of the
patent application. The first exhibit
was a document that discussed the
value and procedure of turning softgel forms of HIV inhibitors into a
solid dosage through a process that
may require the use of a suitable
surfactant. The second exhibit was a
document that explored the process
of selecting a suitable surfactant to
create a solid dosage form of a drug.
Based on these two exhibits, the decision concluded that the process "for
preparing the solid dispersion formulations [of Kaletra] can be achieved
through routine experimentation by
combining the disclosures of [the
first document] with the disclosure of
JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS
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[the second document] ."7As a result,
without discussing the exact standard
required by either the Indian Patent Act or the TRIPS agreement, the
decision rejected Abbott's application
to patent the new version of Kaletra
because the product's innovations
"clearly do not involve [an] inventive
step."3'
Potential Impact
There are at least four potential
impacts that may result from India's
decision to reject Abbott's application. First, the most immediate ramification of the decision may be to
increase access to the drug for people
living with HIV and AIDS in the
developing world. The leading opponent to Abbott's application, I-MAK,
has already claimed that the impact
of the case will be "tremendous."3 9
I-MAK argues that there are over 33
million individuals living with HIV,
and 15 million of them require access
to HIV drugs. According to I-MAK's
calculations, the cost savings from
introducing generic versions of Kaletra that can now be legally produced
and importedby Indian manufactures
are sufficient to make the treatment
available to 130,000 new patients a

year. This sentiment has been echoed
by Doctors Without Borders 40 and
the Health Global Access Project.4'
Second, the decision has the potential to set a precedent in which multinational pharmaceutical corporations are held to a higher standard
when seeking to gain new patents for
improvements on existing innovations in India than in other countries
party to the TRIPS agreement. In the
first month following the rejection of
Abbott's application for a new Kaletra patent on December 30, 2010, at
least five major patents were rejected
or revoked on similar grounds.4 2
Analysts have argued that this is part
of a trend in India of favoring process
over product when evaluating patent applications, and that applying
new process to improve upon existing products will be increasingly less
COST AND END-OF-LIFE CARE * SUMMER

likely to receive protection. Given
India's large domestic market and
generic drug industry, this shift has
the potential to make it even more
difficult for U.S.- and Europeanbased pharmaceutical companies to
compete in the developing market.
Third, the decision has the potential to change the behavior of Abbott
and other multinational pharmaceutical companies. After being denied a
patent in 2006, Novartis claimed that
there is "no faster way to kill access to
the latest life-saving drugs for people
in India than to avoid offering patent protection."4 This proved to be
true in Thailand, where in 2007 the
Ministry of Public Health decided to
issue a compulsory license on Kaletra
to allow the import of generic drugs
from India.44 Abbott's response was
to reduce the price for Kaletra in 40
countries, but also to withdraw registration for all new products in Thailand. A similar response may occur in
India if multinational pharmaceutical companies feel that they are not
being provided with adequate protection for their intellectual property.
This may lead to a lag between when
drugs are available in Western markets, and when patients in the developing world are able to benefit from
new pharmaceutical innovations.
Fourth, the decision will lead to
an increase in claims that India's
domestic patent regime falls short
of its obligations under the WTO's
TRIPS agreement.45 Since Europe
has already signaled its intention to
extend patent protection to the new
solid dosage form of Kaletra, this case
only highlights the drift between the
protections being afforded multinational corporations in the West and
in India. 46 The Office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR)
had already placed India on its priority watch list as a result of its actions
"to limit the patentability of potentially beneficial innovations, such as
temperature-stable forms of a drug
47
or new means of drug delivery."
Since this decision took exactly that
2011

course of action, it is likely that India
will face increased pressure to either
clarify or amend their existing patent
laws to be most consistent with the
United States' interpretation of the
TRIPS agreement.
Conclusion
The decision by the Indian Patent
Office in Mumbai to reject Abbott
Laboratories' application to patent
a new solid dosage form of Kaletra
highlights the fact that the TRIPS
agreement did not end the tug of war
between groups hoping to increase
access to life-saving medications in
the developing world and those seeking to provide robust protection to
intellectual property to ensure that
incentives exist to guarantee the continued development of innovative
treatments for diseases. As a result,
it remains to be determined whether
the long-term impact of this decision will be to increase the availability of generic drugs, or alternatively,
to reign in the existing discretion
that allows nations to define what
constitutes an "inventive step" when
reviewing pharmaceutical patent
applications.
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